We're not talking about whether the cause is just or unjust. We're talking about consensus, consent, absence of consent, legality, absence of legality, constitutionality, absence of constitutionality. Why do we keep motives out? Because motives differ. Motives differ and make no difference. First, state terrorism. Second, religious terrorism; terrorism inspired by religion, Catholics killing Protestants, Sunnis killing Shiites, Shiites killing Sunnis, God, religion, sacred terror, you can call it if you wish.
State, church. All kinds of crimes commit terror. There is pathology. You're pathological. You're sick. You want the attention of the whole world. You've got to kill a president. You will. You terrorize. You hold up a bus. Political terror of the private group.
Oppositional terror. Keep these five in mind. Keep in mind one more thing. Sometimes these five can converge on each other. You start with protest terror. You go crazy. You become pathological. You continue. They converge. State terror can take the form of private terror. For example, we're all familiar with the death squads in Latin America or in Pakistan.
Government has employed private people to kill its opponents. It's not quite official. It's privatized. Or the political terrorist that goes crazy and becomes pathological. Or the criminal who joins politics. Drugs and guns often go together. Smuggling of all things often go together. Of the five types of terror, the focus is on only one, the least important in terms of cost to human lives and human property - the Political Terror of those who want to be heard.
The highest cost is state terror. The second highest cost is religious terror, although in the twentieth century religious terror has, relatively speaking, declined. If you are looking historically, massive costs. The next highest cost is crime. Next highest, pathology.
No politics. Simply crime and pathology. So the focus is on only one, the political terrorist, the PLO, the Bin Laden, whoever you want to take.
Why do they do it? What makes the terrorist tick? I would like to knock them out quickly to you. First, the need to be heard. Imagine we are dealing with a minority group, the political, private terrorist. Normally, and there are exceptions, there is an effort to be heard, to get your grievances heard by people. They're not hearing it. A minority acts. The majority applauds. The Palestinians, for example, the superterrorists of our time, were dispossessed in From to they went to every court in the world.
They knocked at every door in the world. They were told that they became dispossessed because some radio told them to go away-an Arab radio, which was a lie. Nobody was listening to the truth. Finally, they invented a new form of terror, literally their invention: the airplane hijacking.
Between and they pulled the world up by its ears. They dragged us out and said, Listen, Listen. We listened. We still haven't done them justice, but at least we all know. Even the Israelis acknowledge. They damn well exist now. We are cheating them at Oslo. At least there are some people to cheat now. We can't just push them out. The need to be heard is essential.
One motivation there. Mix of anger and helplessness produces an urge to strike out. You are angry. You are feeling helpless. You want retribution. You want to wreak retributive justice. The experience of violence by a stronger party has historically turned victims into terrorists. Battered children are known to become abusive parents and violent adults. That's what happens to peoples and nations.
When they are battered, they hit back. State terror very often breeds collective terror. Do you recall the fact that the Jews were never terrorists?
By and large Jews were not known to commit terror except during and after the Holocaust. Most studies show that the majority of members of the worst terrorist groups in Israel or in Palestine, the Stern and the Irgun gangs, were people who were immigrants from the most anti-Semitic countries of Eastern Europe and Germany.
Similarly, the young Shiites of Lebanon or the Palestinians from the refugee camps are battered people. They become very violent. The ghettos are violent internally. They become violent externally when there is a clear, identifiable external target, an enemy where you can say, 'Yes, this one did it to me'. Then they can strike back. Example is a bad thing. Example spreads. There was a highly publicized Beirut hijacking of the TWA plane. After that hijacking, there were hijacking attempts at nine different American airports.
Pathological groups or individuals modeling on the others. Even more serious are examples set by governments. When governments engage in terror, they set very large examples. When they engage in supporting terror, they engage in other sets of examples. Absence of revolutionary ideology is central to victim terrorism. Revolutionaries do not commit unthinking terror. Those of you who are familiar with revolutionary theory know the debates, the disputes, the quarrels, the fights within revolutionary groups of Europe, the fight between anarchists and Marxists, for example.
But the Marxists have always argued that revolutionary terror, if ever engaged in, must be sociologically and psychologically selective. Don't hijack a plane.
Don't hold hostages. Don't kill children, for God's sake. Have you recalled also that the great revolutions, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Algerian, the Cuban, never engaged in hijacking type of terrorism? They did engage in terrorism, but it was highly selective, highly sociological, still deplorable, but there was an organized, highly limited, selective character to it.
So absence of revolutionary ideology that begins more or less in the post-World War II period has been central to this phenomenon. My final question is - These conditions have existed for a longtime. But why then this flurry of private political terrorism? Why now so much of it and so visible? The answer is modern technology. You have a cause. You can communicate it through radio and television. They will all come swarming if you have taken an aircraft and are holding Americans hostage.
They will all hear your cause. You have a modern weapon through which you can shoot a mile away. They can't reach you. And you have the modern means of communicating. When you put together the cause, the instrument of coercion and the instrument of communication, politics is made.
A new kind of politics becomes possible. To this challenge rulers from one country after another have been responding with traditional methods. The Spanish government labelling ETA as terrorists also helped legitimise the government internationally.
Spanish media perpetuated this tactic, making ETA appear extremist through one sided violence. Therefore, ETA were labelled as terrorists to quell dissent in Basque country and legitimise the government internationally. This was especially because the government used their political marginalisation to delegitimise its cause. The Basque Observatory on Human Rights notes how the requirement for all political parties to immediately condemn each terrorist attack would create alarmist tendencies.
Since , ETA has complied to an agreed ceasefire with the government. Further, Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson emphasised how peace processes invariably transitioned terrorists to freedom fighters. Pruitt discusses how Al Qaeda could never be involved in peace processes because they would never have a role in mainstream politics, and their Islamic ideology was too difficult to rationalise. Its ideology of nationalism and separatism were also achievable goals, rather than unachievable aims to justify further violence.
ETA specifically mandated for international actors to remain in negotiations to prove legitimacy. This acknowledgement emphasised how ETA and the Spanish government were both legitimate actors in a mutual agreement for, on some level, greater Basque freedom. This is ultimately demonstrated in the lasting ceasefire today.
This paper demonstrated how ETA were fundamentally freedom fighters as their armed struggle was necessary in resisting oppression by the Spanish government. It firstly highlighted how ETA played a crucial role in protecting Basque culture.
ETA played a critical role during and after the Franco era in uniting the Basque community. Through making violence a key part of Basque identity, the community was able to unite against oppression. Secondly, the Spanish government labelled ETA as terrorists in order to justify their repressive actions. As a result of such violence, the ensuing negotiations, alongside the support of the international community, highlighted how their armed struggle was fundamentally necessary in furthering Basque freedom.
Abrahams, Max. Alonso, Rogelio. Canberra: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ideolgia y estrategia politica de ETA: Analisis de su evolucion entre y Madrid: Siglo XXI, Blackwell, D. Carr, Caleb. Child, Emily. Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. Nevada: University of Nevada Press, Criado, Henar. Howard and P. Paret trans. Coady, C. Evans, M. Finley, C. Ganor, B. Nathanson, S. Orend, B. Primoratz, I.
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